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Abstract 
An integrated planning framework for a system of regions has to take into account 
inter alia the following elements: 
(1) interrelationships (spatial spillovers, e.g.) between reglons;. 
(2) intraregional conflicts among the set of relevant regional objectives; 
(3) interregional conflicts due to diverging interests of the regions within the 
system at hand,; 
(4) the availability of relevant and appropriate data. 
Thus far,- muitiobjeetive decision methods concentrated mainly on the element 
(2) and to a lesser extent on (3). Multilevel planning models mainly dealt with 
elements (3) and (4-). 
This paper tries to integrate these two approaches by providing an analytical 
framework for integrated regional planning for a spatial system. An interesting 
aspect of this combination of methods is that it' may include the possibility of « 
doublé Interactive procedures. In multilevel planning the interaction pertains to 
theexchange of information between a central planning unit and regional planning 
authorities. In multiobjective decision methods the interaction takes place between 
the decision-making committee and the analyst(s) providing scientific assistance in 
identifying efficiënt points and in suggesting compromise solutions. 
The resuils will be illustrated by means of' a numerical application to a multi-
regional model with economie and environmental objectives. 
1. Introduction 
Multiobjective decision models are becoming increasingly popular in private and 
public policy analysis. The multidimensional nature of choice problems, the con-
flicting options in real-world policy problems and the external spillovers of many 
decisions have evoked the need of an operational analytical framework which is,in 
agreement with the complex structure of many choice problems. 
Multiobjective decision models are based on the assumption that the absence of a 
common denominator for policy objectives leads inevitably to conflicts among the 
performance levels of diverse policy criteria. Such conflicts may emerge from 
several sources: 
(1) a conflict between various objectives to be achieved simultaneously by one 
decision-maker or decision-committee (interior conflict); for example, the aims 
of maximum income and of maximum leisure time. 
(2) a conflict between various decision-makers or decision-units regarding the 
achievement of one or more policy objectives (exterior conflict); for example, 
the claims of environmentalists versus those of the suppbrters of economie 
growth. 
(3) a-conflict between different levels in the policy and decision hierarchy' 
(multilevel conflict); for example, diverse interests of a central 
government versus regional authorities. 
(4) a conflict between the achievement of short-run.results versus long-run 
goals (intertemporal conflict); for example, the divergence in interests 
of the present generation versus those of the future generation. 
These conflicts are represented in a concise manner in Fig. 1 
Conflictsof type (1) and (2) have often been studied in multiobjective 
programming theory; conflicts of type(3) and (4) have recëived much less' 
attention in a multiobjective framework. 
The,present study aims at providing a synthesizing framework for conflicts 
of type (1), (2) and (3). The assumption will be made that there are several 
decision units, viz. regions, which are competing with respect to each other 
(exterior conflicts due to spatial spillovers). Furthermore, the actions and 
decisions of the various regions are to be coordinated by a1 control planning 
unit (either as a top-down or centralized policy or as a bottom-up or decen-
tralized policy), while this decision unit has also its own interests (multi-
level conflicts). Finally, each region has a multiplicity óf conflicting 
objectives (interior conflicts). 
This paper will provide an integrated analysis of the various conflicts 
and compromises in such multiobjective, multiregional and multilevel decision 
and choice problems. Because the translation of multilevel decision-making 
into multiobjective notions is fairly new, more extensive attention will be 
paid to multilevel programming theory, its computational aspects and its 
relationship tö multiobjective decision-making. 
After a formal comprehensive analysis of the three above mentioned types 
of conflicting objectives, an empirical illustration will be presented on the 
basis of a multiregional economie model incorporating- inter alia pollution, 
employment and multiple decision levels. . 
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2. An Integrated Framework of Multiobjective, Multiregional and,' 
Multilevel Decisionmakingê 
In, the present section the traditional assumption of independent dècision 
units will be abandoned. Instead, a multiregional systém composed of R 
mutully dependent regions will be assumed; this-interdependence emerg'es 
from spatial spillover effects. Each region is considered, to be a spatially 
decentralized dècision unit aiming at achieving a set of multiple objectives. 
Furthermore, there is a central dècision or planning unit which attempts to 
'coordinate the various regional'dècision strategies. Assuming J different 
objectives (j = l,...,J), R regions (r=l,...,R) and one central unit c, the 
following joint matrix SI of objective functions for thè total' spatial system 
may be assumed: 
(2.1.) fl = 
•lc 
Jc 
11 
Jl 
IR 
"Jr 
where u> represents a certain objective function (production growth, environment,al 
quality, equitable distribution, e.g.). Each objective function w^r is functio- " 
nally determined by a set of state variables _s. , a set of instrument variables 
t. , a set of external state and instrument variables y_. (from surrounding r'egions) 
and a set of exgenous variables e. : 
• ~3r 
(2.2.) ü>. = w.' (s. , t. , y. , e. ) 
The arguments of m. are assumed to be related to each other by means of 
an underlying functional. structure: 
f (t. , y. , e. ) (2.3.) s. 
Then the multiobjective program of region r attempts to maximize u.. (j=l,...,j) 
subject to (2.3.) and other side-conditions (inequaiities, e.g.). 
The conflicts inherent in a separate optimization of the successive objective 
functions (either at an individual or at a regional scale) can be represented 
by means of the following pay-off matrix P (see also Nijkamp £l978j ) 
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The elements on the main diagonal of (2.4.) represent the absolute maxima 
of the corresponding functions. The block-diagonal matrices of (2.4.) 
represent the intraregional conflicts: they represent the values of a 
certain objective function in region r when a competing objective function 
in region r is maximized. The off-diagonal blocks represent interregional 
conflicts:they indicate the value of a certain objective function in regio r 
when an objective function in another region is maximized. 
In case of a centralized decision system, the central unit will indicate 
the limits within which the successive regional units have to achieve their 
objectives. In a decentralized system the successive regions will give signals 
to the central cooréinating unit in order to reconcile the various, interests. 
This situation implies an extension of traditional multiobjective programming: 
in addition to conflicts between objectives one has to deal with conflicts 
between regions (or decentralized decision units), so that a doublé choice 
conflict has to be coped with at a higher decision level. This problem of 
multilevel decisionmaking and its relationship to multiobjective programming 
will be discussed in the next sections. 
3. Multilevel Programming: General 
Multilevel programming methods have been developed since the early sixties. 
They are capable to-solve large scale programming problems by means of 
decomposition. The methods, can also be used to study the coordination of the 
decisions of subdivisions by a central unit , 
The idea of multilevel programming can be illustrated by means of the 
following linear programming problem:
 s , 
r. 
max; 
•^i 
(3.1.)< 
^1 +SQ *2 + . . ' ' +-CR *R 
B l i l . 
< 
N h 
B 2 - 2 . S h. 
'
BR-XR S ^R 
X > 
—r -* 
r=l,., 
where x_ is the vector with instrumental and state variables of region r. 
The vector >c has to satisfy -a number of side-conditions denoted by 
B x < b For the moment we assume that the regions have established an 
r —r ^ —r . , 
overall objective function u> = c' x , where c is the vector with coefficients 
r —r —r - —r 
corresponding with JC .'For the time being, we also assume;that the central ob-
jective is the maximization of the sum of the regional objective functions. 
Problem (3.1.) is separable: the overall optimum can be attained when each 
region r solves- its own decision problem: ' 
(3.2.) 
max; u> =c x 
r —r —r 
As.t. x x b 
—ir s —r 
> £ 
In this case coordination is not necessary because of the lack of interdepen-
denties be'tween regions. When interdependencies are included into (.3-, 1.) ,'b'y • 
< a , the whole situation means of the additional constraints I A 
r r 
x 
—r changes. Different types of common constraints can be distinguished. 
2) 
They iiiay pertam in ter alia to - , 
(1) common resources to be distributed amóng regions (manpower, capital, 
subsidies, funds), ' 
(2) common tasks to be performed by the regions (provision of sufficiënt 
outputs) 
(3) spill-over effects (immission of pollutants from surrounding regions) 
Thus the central programming problem reads aö: 
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(3.3.) 
max! 
s.t. 
^1 + 
2Ll + 
±2 
B22i2 
A2 x2 + 
.+ c 
-R "R 
BR^R 
.+ AR xR 
.< b, 
* ^ 
^-
bR 
^ £ 
', r=l,.. .R 
Given these interdependencies, it is improbable that an uncoordinated 
solution of the regional problems (3.2.) will yield the optimal solution 
of (3.3). There are essentially two ways in which the centre can try to 
achieve such aN coordination ; 
A) it can imposè additional constraints on problem (3.2.) to ensure that 
the costs and benefits of the common constraints are distributed in 
such a way that the overall optimum will be reached. 
B) it can introducé prices into (3.2.) to charge the regions for their use 
of the common resources. 
Given the information contained in (3.3.), it is not difficult to compute 
these constraints or prices. In most cases, however, this information xm. 
(c_ , b_ , B and A ) is not completely known to the centre. Actually this 
uncertainty about the structure of the decision problem is an essential 
characteristic of central planning problems. 
It is an attractive property of multilevel programming methods that they 
explicitly recognize this uncertainty. They do not aim at finding an immediate 
solution by means of fuil information about the problem, but they aim at provi-
ding a step vise approximation of the optimal solution by means of exchange of 
information between centre and subdivisions. 
Various methods have been developed for such a communication process. 
They can be distinguisted inter alia according to the following characteristics 
(cf Kornai [1965] and Malinvaud [1972] ): 
1. the nature of the indices generated by the centre 
2. the way in which these indices have been comüuted 
3. the nature of indices generated by the'subdivisions 
4. the way in which these indices have been computed 
5. the termination rule 
6. the way in which the final decision is formulated. 
(3.4) 
The two.ways mentioned above to internalïze the extemal effécts intó , 
the subdivisional decision problems can be elaborated as follows, , 
A. Direct method (for example,. Kornai [1965] )., ' 
This method is called direct, because the centre directly distributes the 
common resources a among the subdivisions, The centre generates a provisional 
distribution of resources (a, ,<,..,,a , satisfying T. a = a). Each subdivisioh 
—1 —r r —r -
r solves , 
max! (o_ 
s.t. 
c ' , x 
—r —r 
x < b 
—r —r 
x ^ a 
—v ^ —r 
x 
—r 
and reports the shadow nrices w_ of the common resources back to the centre. 
Given this.information about the prices, the centre revises the distribution of . 
resources to increase the efficiency of the use of the common resources. When 
all shadow prices ir_ are equal (r=l,...R)>a redistribution does not increase 
efficiency, so that th-e optium has been attained.' 
B. Indirect method (for example,. Dantzig and Wolfe [1960]) 
This method is called indirect, because the centre computes the distribution 
of resources only after that the optimal Drices of these resources have been 
determined. 
The centre starts with the generation of prövisional prices ir_ for the common 
resources. The subdivisions solve: . 
r 
(a.5) 
max: c' x - ir' A x 
—r —r- — r —r 
\ s.t. B x < 
r —r N 
b 
—r 
and reDort back to the centre the ODtimal amounts a they need from a• 
If I a 
r -r 
a_ ,the overall ODtimum has been attained, If not, the centre has 
to revise the prices such that this equality can be reached ultimately. 
The methods share the characteristic that the centre does not need to 
know anything about the A , B , b , c at the start of the procedure. 
r' r —r —r K 
They differ with respect to the nature of the indices exchanged (see Fig, 2) 
9 -
centre 
subdivisions 
O - -
indirect method 
© - - - - 0 
direct method 
Fig. 2 Exchange of indices between centre and subdivisions, 
In the next section we will give a more detailed descriütion of the 
procedures to be used by the centre in order to guarantee a converging 
interaction. 
4. Multilevel Programming: Comoutational Aspects 
As a starting point we have chosen Dantzig and Wolfe's [1960] algorithm 
for the indirect method, Le't S be the set of all x_ satisfying the con-
straints in (3.2.): 
(4.1.) S = {x I B x < b ; x > o} 
,
 r _ r i r _ E r. ' _ r 
The set S contains (say) K 
extreme póints: x , x r 
—r -r 
Let the matrix T be defined as: 
r 
(4.2.) +1 +2 x , x 
—r —r 
+ r 
x 
As S is a convex polyhedron, each element x of S can be written as a positive 
linear combination of the K extreme points: 
Vx 6 S 3. it Ci-'y = 1, y > 0 ) such that x = T u 
—r r -r - -r -r - - —r r cr 
Consequently, (3.1) can be rewritten as: 
(4.3.) 
max! c_^  Tx y1 + c^  T2 y2 + 
•
 +
 5R TR HR 
s.t. AiTi Hi + A2T2 H2 + •••• + ¥ R HR < i 
i'y . = 1 
U > 0 
-r - -
r = 1,...R 
r. = 1,...R 
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The result of t:his reformulation is that (3.1) can be solved without 
explicit knowledge of B ,...B , once the matrices T ,...T are known. Dantzig and 
Wolfe have developed an algorithm to detérmine' a sufficiently large part of 
T ,...T to enabJLe the computation of the optimum. Starting with one or some 
3") o 
.provisional 'solutions of S , summarized in the matrix T , in each step i(i=l,2,3. 
a matrix T can' be constructed by adding a new extreme solution x_ , of S to the 
i — 1 ~hi ' 
matrix T . The solutions x (r = 1....R) can be found as follows: 
r —r . ._ . . . . 
(a) The centre solves (4.3.) for T^ . It determines the shadow prices TT . •" ' 
of the common constraints and reports these prices to the subdivisions< 
(b) The subdivisions solve (2.5.) given jr and report the optimal values of x^ to 
the centre : ' 
+i i~l (c) These solutions x are added as x to the matrices T 
—r • —v v 
If the central objective function can not be increased,"stop the procedure.. 
Otherwise, set i=i+l and return to (a)., 
The authors prove that when (4.3) is nondegenerate, this procedure will 
' converge in a finite number of iterations. 
We turn now to the direct method of multilevel planning. 
Given the initial distribution submitted to the subdivisions (a, ,..,.%) and 
o o . _ 1 ^ 
the prices (tr_ ,. . . , i j reported to the centre, there are several ways to 
1 - 1 
generate a new distribution (a. ;...,a ) with a better overall performance. 
We start with a very simple approach, developed by Schleicher [1971]. 
It is based on the observation that when the price of resource k reported by 
region r and denoted by TT, is larger than the corresponding price in region r' 
(TF , ), the overall performance of the- system increases when a ». is reduced 
in favour of a^ . Thus the direction,of redistribution can be determined. 
For the size of redistribution' we introducé the variable' 1, indicating the 
step size. , 
We introducé the following criteria for a rule of redistribution: 
(a)I 4 = ak /kSl,...K _ .^  • 
(b)xfTtkl = ....=TTkÊ, then (akl ,....akR ) = (akl, aRR) 
(c) the a should lead to feasible solutions of (3.4) for r=l,....R 
—r . ' 
(d) z1 5 z i _ 1 
4) Consider (4.4) as a rule of redistribution 
(^ >.4 = 4N fe 
r kr 
ak 
- l i -
lt can easily be checked that 0.4-) satisfies (a) and (b), while 
Schleicher shows that by an appropriate choice of the step size q-, 
also (c) and (d) hold true. Obviously, when I n . = 0 there is no 
J
 r kr 
need for a redistribution. Schleicher proves that this procedure 
converges, though in general not in a finite number of steps. 
Kornai [1965] formulates an alternative approach. He formulates 
the central decision problem in step i as: 
(4.5) 
maxi I I Ti^ k ar]< 
r k 
s .t. Z a , = a. k=l,.. .K 
rk k 
r 
Obviously, (4.5) may give may give rise to very extreme outcomes for the 
distribution of the a . When no nonnegativity conditions have been 
K 
formulated for some of the a , (4.5) may even become unbounded. 
Therefore, Kornai adds upper and lower bounds to (4.5), which can be 
revised in every step, but even then the outcomes of (4.5)'may show 
considerable oscillations. 
Therefore, some averaging procedure is introduced, so" that the dis-
tribution of'resources proposed in step i is a weighted mean of the 
solution of (4.5) and of the solutions in former steps. The algorithm 
can be proved to converge, but in general not in a finite number of steps. 
One of' the characteristics of Schleicher's method is that in step i a new 
distribution of resources is computed, given the information of step i-1, 
so that the information in the steps 1, 2, ..., i-2 remains unused. In this 
respect, Kornai' method can' be preferred to Schleicher's one, although the way 
in which the information from preceding steps is used, does not seem to be very 
efficiënt. Ten Kate [1972] proposes an alternative formulation of (4.5) which 
warrants a more efficiënt use of the available-information. 
A very interesting aspect of this procedure .is its narrow relation-
ship with the Dantzig-Wolfe algorithm. 
Essentially it is equivalent to the application of the Dantzig-Wolfe 
algorithm to the dual form of (3.3). 
The procedure can be exposed as follows. Let v denote the vector 
—r 
with shadow prices of the divisional constraints B x ^ b in (3.4) in 
i ' i r -r - -r 
step x... Then rj. = b v_ represents the value of the divisional resources 
b. in step i. 
12 -
The central problem, in step i can be formulated as: 
(4.6) 
max: 
s.t. 
z
*
=
 r-
V 
r 
r ^ 
i -t
-
Z a, i . 
r kr \ 
kr kr 
k=l,,.. 
.i-1; r=l,, 
K 
By means of (4.6) the common resources are redistributed in step i, 
given the information in all preceding steps. The relationship between 
(4.6) and Kornai's formulation (4.5) can be seen more clearly when (4.6) 
< is reformulated as: 
(4.7) i 
max; 
s.t. 
I 
r 
\ min 
.i-1 l
nr kr kr 
I 
r \r = % k=l. .K 
5) We find that (4.5) and (4.7) are equivalent for i=l. When i: > 1, (4.7) 
has the advantage above (4.5) that the objective function is concave rather 
thari linear, which reduces the possibility that the optium implies an 
extreme outcome. 
.It can be shown that the procedure cohverges in a finite number of 
steps.. For the outcomes of the objective functions the following relation-
ships can be established: 
(4.8) 
r 
i+1 
s 
c 
i 
i=l,2,3: 
r ^ c i=0,l,25.... 
forms a monotone nonincreasing series., Thus, [z , z ..... z ( 5
 V. c' c' cj 
Although it can be shown that the final value of z is larger than all the 
preceding ones, it can not be shown that {z ', z , . . .z } is monotone non-
decreasing. Temporarily, this series may show a decrease, a decrease, which 
is a disadvantage, since it may reduce the willingness of the central and 
subdivisional planning agencies to continue their cooperation during the 
interaction. 
Further information about these and other methods can be found in the 
appendix. " 
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5. Multilevel Programming and Muitiobjeetive Programming. 
The preceding multilevel planning methods are based on the assumption that 
the central objective function z is simply the sum total of the regional objec-
tive functions co . In practice, most authors appear to interpret z as the na-
tional product, which is indeed the sum of the regional products w . 
In this section we will deal with the question of how multilevel planning 'has 
to be organized when less rigid assumptions concerning the contents of the objec-
tive functions are formulated. 
A first step might be a central objective function which is a weighted sum of 
the regional objective functions. For example: co denotes regional pollution and 
z = E X co denotes the national damage produced by this pollution where X is an 
index of the damage caused by one unit of pollution in region r. A brief inspec-
tion teaches that the algorithms dealt with in section 4 can be maintained after 
minor modifications. 
A more fundamental problem ,arises when the regional objective functions are 
t 
considered to.be essentially multióbjective in nature. Let co . = (w • ,.... M , ) 
-r ir Jr 
denote the vector with the performance of the J objectives in region r. The ob-
jectives depend on the instrument and state variables in the following way: 
u_ = C x . Suppose that the regions have formulated a priori vectors with 
weights X to be attached to the co_ '' s:. Then regional welfare can be directly mea-
~r , r 
sured as / X_ C x . One should realize, lowever, that this is only one possible 
way to measure regional welfare. Any monotone increasing transformation such as 
t
 c (a + b \ C x ) yields the same outcome for (3.5) and can also be conceived of 
—r r —r 
as a measure of regional welfare (cf, Kapteyn [1977]) . 
The indeterminant nature' of the welfare function also means that the dual vari-
ables _rr• • of (3.5) are not unique. Consequently, in direct methods where the 
regions specify the successive weights, the centre can only use the Information 
from subdivisions in a meaningful way when it reaches agreement about the way in 
which regional welfare has to be measured. 
A related problem arises in indirect methods. Say that the central objective 
function is: max! .21. a. w. , where a. is the weight attached by the centre to jr. ;jr jr jr ° » 
the j-th objective of region r. Application of the Dantzig-Wolfe method would 
mean that the dual variables TT_ reported to the subdivisions appear in the follow-
ing revised version of the objective function in (3.4): 
c ' (5.1) maxi (a + b X'G x^ ) - TT A x 
— -p—r — r~r 
which is again only meaningful when a common Standard for regional and national 
welfare has been formulated. 
T, 14 
Another severe problem with indirect methods -is that the payment ir' A .x 
for the use of scarce common resources a_ is very difficult to interpret in 
terms of welfare. Money is transferable, but welfare transfers are hard to 
,imagine. Therefore, it can hardly be defended that (5.1) can be handled 
effectively by the subdivisions in a multiobjective context. • 
It is a•well-known common feature of many.multiobjective methods that they 
aim at analyzing alternatives in terms of the diverse objectives rather than 
in terms of unifying concepts such as utility and welfare. It may, -therefore,. 
be interesting to develop multilevel planning .methods according to this prin-
ciple. This,would mean that the information produced does no longer deal with 
dual variables reflecting the marginal change in welfare given a marginal change 
in resources. In the new context, the dual variables reflect the marginal change 
in the various objectives, given a. marginal change in resources.' Obviously, the 
number of prices to be calculated in this approach increases with a factor J. 
We will develop this idea for the direct methods of multilevel planning. Con~ 
sider the allocation problem for subdivisions: 
maxi 
(5.2)7 
s.t. 
X 
—r 
0) 
—r 
= C r - r 
B X 
—r 
< b 
—r 
A x 
r:—r 
< a 
—r 
Instead of the vector of dual variables ir' = (TT., . 
— r Ir' 
.ir ) related to the 
K common resources, we compüte now.the matrix of dual variables II with 
: i r 
-elements TT., reflecting the marginal change inobjective j given a marginal 
change in resource k in-region r. ünlike ir , the matrix II cannot be derived 
~r ^ r 
directly from the Simplex tableau, A sensitivity analysis is needed to compute 
the matrix (cf. Wagner [1975], p.130). Since wë know that • TT. - X \ ^ •-, , the 
kr j jr ]kr 
J-th row of II can be found directly when the preceding J-1 rows have been deter-.-
mined. 
Schleicher's algorithm can be generalized for the multiobjective case in the 
following way. Let i .denote the.variables establlshed in the i-th iteration. Then 
the redistribution of resources has to obey the following rule: 
(5.3) a. ' .= a, + q 
kr kr. • ^L 
/ I Y. ir 
• ir ikr 1 _ - „ 
X I Y- TT., 
]r ]kr 
\ r
1
 3 
I a. 
'kr 
where the y. are the coefficients of.the central obnective function I Y. U. 
3r . ir ir ]r 
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Ten Kate's method to derive a new distribution of resources can be general-
ized as follows: 
(5.H) J s.t 
max I. v 
r r 
< 
r kr 
I 
= a, 
V .> TT 
jr ]kr 
1 
kr + 4» jr -jr 
r = 1,...R 
i' = 0,1,...i-1 
k = 1,...K 
where r\. denotes the contribution of the divisional resources in iteration i jr . ï i to the i-th obiective. Notice that X \ . r\. = n • 
. . ir ir , r 3 
The conclusion is that multilevel planning algorithms can be generalized for 
muitiobjeetive problems, although it implies a heavier computational burden for 
both the centre and the subdivisions. 
There are* several directions for additional res-earch. It might be interesting 
to extend the analysis for non-linear welfare functions. By means of goal pro-
gramming, it is possible to introducé certain achievement standards for the objec-
tives to be attained by all regions. Another possible specification of the central 
welfare function u (in , . co
 R) might be a separable one such as: 
"Jl'--'- .IR" 
u = ÜI .,/u „, where co - indicates the welfare based on the national aggregates of 
c cl c2 cl 
the regional objectives, while to
 n is an indicator of the multidimensional inter-
c2 
regional inequalities (cf. Blommesteinj Nijkamp and Rietveld [1979]). 
It is also possible to abandon the use of welfare functions which are formu-
lated a priori. Then Interactive multiobjective decision methods are the appro-
priate tooi. This would imply a doublé interaction: 
(1) between the centre and the subdivisions and 
(2) between the planning authorities and the analysts to provide scientific 
assistance. This idea is illustrated in Fig. 3. 
Fig. 3. Interactions in a multilevel .multiobjective planning process. 
Some of the multilevel planning methods discussed above will be applied to a 
numerical problem in-the next section. 
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6. A Numerical'Application • - . • 
The model discussed 'her'e is a simple two-region model for the Netherlands. 
Consider an interregional input-output model with the following elements: 
- 4 sectors : agriculture, industry, services, transport (s=l,....4) 
- 2 regions : Rijnmond (the greater Rotterdam region)and the rest of 
the Netherlands (r=l,2) 
- 2 objectives : maximization of regional income and minimization of regional 
pollution (j=l,2). 
The following variables are distinguished: \ 
i 
y = (y ...... y ) : production levels in sectors 1,....4 in region r 
e : emission of pollutants in region r 
m : immission of pollutants in region r 
. .i., ) : investments in sectors- 1,..4 in region r. 4r ° i = (ii . 
— r ir' 
The two objectives are: 
t . 
maxi u. =c y and min! u„ = 
Ir —r ^ -r 2r m 
where c contains the value added coefficients in reeion r. 
—"P . 
The model contains 11 common constraints: ' 
1) There are 8 input-output' relationships describing the intermediate deliverieé 
between the 4 sectors in both regions: 
(6.1) 
-I+A 11 
21 
12 
•I+A 
22 
2l 
^2 
* SLi 
where the matrices A reflect the input-output matrices and where -a^ indicates 
the requirements for the final demand^in the various sectors. 
-1 
2) One constraint is-imposed which reflects a limited amount a for total invest-
ments: • • 
(6.2) • i ^ + 1" i 2 ^ a2 ' 
3) Two constraints describe the relationships between the, immission of pollutants 
in a certain region and the emission in bbth regions. 
(6.3) ny - h n e± - ^ e^ = 0 
1 m2 " h12 81 " h22 82 = ° 
where the coefficients h denote the multiregional diffusion pattern of pollution. 
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In addition to these 11 constraints, there are for both regions 6 divisional 
constraints: 
1) Four constraints concern the restricted amounts of capital for each sector 
( 6 . 4 - ) y - s i < s X 
where s is the diagonal matrix with capital productivities and 1< the vector, 
with the amounts of capital available at the beginning of the planning period. 
2) One constraint has been imposed with respect to the limited amount of labour 
available: 
(6.5) i' L y < b. 
—
 r ir \ 2r 
where L is the diagonal matrix with labour productivities and b9 is the labour 
force in region r. 
3) One relationship describes the links between the production levels in a region 
and the emission of pollution: 
( 6 . 6 ) e - d y = 0 
r —r —r 
where d is a vector with emission coefficients. 
— r • • • 
The values of the coefficients can be found in Mastenbroek and Nijkamp [1976]. 
First, this model has been used to test-the speed of convergence of the multi-
level planning methods. We have concentrated our attention on two direct methods, 
namely those proposed by Schleicher and Ten Kate, since so far no computational 
results of importance have been published for these methods (cf. Johansen [1978]). 
For this aim, it is not necessary to use the generalized multiobjective approach. 
Therefore we state that co = co„ - co„ , so that co may be conceived of as the 
r Ir 2r r J 
regional income corrected for the damage created by the immission of pollutants. 
The results, of Schleicher's method can be found in Table 1. For each iteration 
i and region r the division of the 11 common resources a haS'been printed as 
well as the shadow'prices TT • computed according to (3.5). There are several 
common constraints which show shadow prices equal to.zero in each iteration. 
Consequently, a revision of the distribution is superfluous in that case. 
Schleicher's method shows a steady but not so very fast growth of the regional 
objectives. ' 
6) 
The same elements have also been depicted for Ten Kate's method (Table 2) 
Obviously, the latter is superior from the point of view of the speed of conver-
gence. In no more than 8 iterations, the optimal distribution of resources has 
been attained. 
- 18 -
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_ *
0 1 8
 1*141 . 0* 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 
7 2' . 7 4 3 7 6 . 2 7 2 1 1 . 5 . 1 2 1 - 5 0 . 0 0 0 - 6 5 0 . 0 0 0 
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8 2 . 6 2 3 7 6 . 9 7 3 1 1 . 5 . 1 8 4 - 5 0 . 0 0 0 - 6 5 0 . 0 0 0 
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' 9 1 - 4 . 5 6 1 - 1 0 6 . 5 0 5 - 7 7 . ~ '~7 .184 2 0 . 0 . 0 0 1 0 0 . 0 0 0 
. 4 2 0 1 . 9 4 5 0 . 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 - 0 . 0 0 0 
9 2 . 5 6 1 7 6 . 5 0 5 1 2 . 5 . 1 8 4 - 5 0 . 0 0 0 - 6 5 0 . 0 0 0 
0 , 0 0 0 ~ 7 . 7 7 7 0 . 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 
1 0 1 - 4 . 5 2 9 - 1 0 6 . 6 4 5 - 7 7 . - 7 . 1 3 4 2 0 . 0 0 0 1 0 0 . 0 0 0 
. 0 1 8 1 . 1 4 1 V - - 0 . ' 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 
10 2 . 5 2 9 7 6 . 6 4 5 ~ 1 2 . ~ 5 . 1 8 4 - 5 0 . 0 0 0 - 6 5 0 . 0 0 0 
0 . 0 0 0 7 . 7 7 7 . 0 . 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 
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0 . 0 0 0 7 . 7 7 7 - 3 . 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 
Table 1 . R e s u l t s of S c h l e i c h e r ' s method of d i r e c t d i s t r i b u t i o n . 
Por e v e r y i t e r a t i o n i and r e g i o n r t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of r e s o u r c e 
d i n g d u a l var iab les 'TT have been d e p i c t e d , r e s p e c t i v e l y . 
7 5 . 3 . 5 6 1 7 1 5 . 6 2 
0 . 4 8 . 9 5 3 . 0 0 
5 5 0 . - 1 8 . 5 6 1 3 4 . 3 7 
0 . 2 . 9 3 0 0 . 0 0 
7 5 . 3 . 9 7 7 7 3 9 . 0 6 
0%* 4 8 . 9 5 8 . 00 
5 5 0 . - 1 8 . 9 7 7 1 0 . 9 3 
0 . . 8 7 6 . 0 4 
7 5 . 4 . 203 7 2 7 . 3 4 
0 . 0 . 0 0 0 . 06 
5 5 0 . - 1 9 . 2 0 3 2 2 . 6 5 
0 . . 0 0 5 . 1 1 
7 5 . 4 . 0 8 6 7 2 5 . 6 7 
0 . 4 8 . 9 5 8 . 0 0 
5 5 0 . - 1 9 . 0 8 6 2 4 . 3 2 
0 . . 0 0 5 . 1 1 
7 5 . - 4 . 3 2 0 7 1 3 . 9 5 
0 . 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 6 
5 5 0 . - 1 9 . 3 2 0 3 6 . 0 4 
0 . . 0 0 5 . 1 1 
a and t h e c o r r e s p o n -
- r 
i r Common r e s o u r c e s ( k = 1 , . . . , 1 1 ) 
1 2 3 4 5 ö 
1 1 - 5 . 0 0 0 - 8 0 . 0 0 0 - 1 0 0 . - 5 . 0 0 0 2 0 . 0 0 0 1 0 0 . 0 0 0 
. . - ^ . . 0 .DÖ0 - - 0 . 0 0 0 - 0 - . ~ J . 0 Ö 0 0 . 0 0 0 • 0 . 0 0 0 
1 2 - - 1 . 0 0 0 - 5 ü . 0 0 0 - 3 5 . 3 . 0 0 0 - 5 0 . 0 0 0 - 6 5 0 . 0 0 0 
. 0 . - 0 0 0 7.9-24 ü'. 1 6 5 . 9 7 9 0 . 0 JO 0 . 0 0 0 
- 2 - 1 - - 5 . 0 0 0 - — 1 4 6 . 6 6 7 - - I O J . - - 7 3 . 3 3 3 2 0 . 0 0 0 1 0 0 . 0 0 0 
0 . 0 0 0 1 . 0 9 9 0 . 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 
2 2 1 . 0 0 0 1 1 6 . 6 6 7 3 5 . 6 8 . 3 3 3 - 5 0 . 0 0 0 - & 5 0 . 0 0 0 
— O»-0.00 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 . 0 . 0 0 U 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 . 0 0 0 
3 .1 -5 ' .0ÖÖ - 9 4 . 8 1 5 - . 1 0 0 . - 7 0 . 3 33 2 0 . 0 0 0 1 0 0 . 0 0 0 
-----1,178 3 . 4 6 1 - - ..O.- . 3 78 0.000 0 , 0 0 0 
- 3 - 2 - - - • - - 1 . 0 0 0 - ' 6 4 . 8 1 5 3 5 . 6 3 . 3 3 3 - 5 0 . 0 0 0 - 6 5 0 . 0 0 0 
, 0 . 0 0 0 7 . 7 7 7 0 . 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 • 0 . 0 0 0 
4 1 - - - 4 . 3 3 3 - l ö 4 . 9 3 6 - 1 0 0 . - 2 7 . 3 6 1 2 0 . 0 0 0 1 0 0 . 0 0 0 
. 4 2 0 1 . 9 4 5 0 . 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 
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•- 0 . 0 0 0 - 0 . 0 0 0 - ü „ - 0 . 0 0 0 . 2 4 1 . 6 6 3 
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0 . 0 . 0 00 . 1 3 5 
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- - . 4 2 0 - 1 . 9 4 5 0 . 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 6 4 
7 2 — - 1 - . 7 5 6 - 1 3 0 . 4 t 9 -3 5 . - I 5 . 86 1 - - 4 1 . 1 1 1 - - 6 0 5 . 556 - 5 5 0 . - 2 0 . 28 1 0 . 0 0 0 
O.OuO 7.67 2 0 . 0 . 0 0 0 0 .000 0 . 0 0 0 O. 0 . 0 0 0 .116 
' 8 - 1 - - 4 . 8 5 0 - 1 6 0 . 9 3 3 - 1 0 0 . - - 2 7 . 861 -• 1 1 . 111 5 5 . 5 5 6 7 5 . 5 . 2 8 1 7 5 0 . 0 0 0 
0 . 0 0 0 1 .105 0 . O.üÜO 0 . 0 0 0 0 .000 0 . O.OüO .097 
3 2 . 8 5 0 1 3 0 . 9 3 3 3 5 . 2 5 . 8 6 1 - 4 1 . 1 1 1 - 6 u 5 . 5 5 6 ^ - 5 5 0 . ^ 2 0 . 2 8 1 0 . 0 0 0 
' - - - - — 4 . 4 1 5 7 . 6 7 2 - 0 . 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 . 0 0 0 . 1 1 6 
Table 2. Results of Ten Kate's method of direct distribution. 
Por every iteration i and region r the distribution of resources a and the correspon 
ding dual-variables ir have been depicted, respectively. 
• 
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The 'cpnclusion which,can be drawn from Tables.1 and 2 is that from 
thé point of view of convergence, Ten Kate's method is superior to 
Schleicher's one. Therefore we have only used the former in the multi-
objective case. • , 
Suppose that the weights attached to income and pullution are (1, -20/3) 
for region 1 and (1, -2/3) for region 2. It canbe -imagined that these. 
weights have been established by means of an interactive multiobjective 
decision method. The corresponding weights for the centre are, (1, -1). 
Obviously, in this case the central welfare func'tion is not the sum of the 
regiónal welfare functions. - . . . . - • 
The results of the multiobjective multilevel planningmethod have been 
presented in TabIe 3. For every iteration i and region r the distribution 
of resources has been given followed by thé (2xlï) matrices n with 
shadowprices pertaining to both objectives. In the,last 'column the values 
of both objectives have been presented. This method leads essentially to 
the same final result as in Table 2,. This identity is exceptional, however, 
since in the case of divergent priorities it is probable that the subdivisions. 
da notN use the resources in a way which is optimal from the'point of view 
7) . . . 
of the centre. Hence, thé centre will anticipate this divergence by a 
redistribution'of the resources such that the final result is as close as 
possible to the solütion which would arisê in a harmohy of priorities. 
We may conclude, therefore, that in general in the case of multiple objectives, 
* the centre has to accept a certain decrease in the attainment, of its objectives 
when it uses a System of decentralized decision making. This decrease can be 
conceiyed of as a cost of decentralization. There are several ways in 
' which the centre can reduce this cost of decentralization. - - , -
1. The centre may impose additional side-conditions. on the regiónal 
decision problems '(3.H.) to induce a policy which is in accordance with 
the central priorities. 
2. The centre may specify exactly how the common resources have to be used 
in the regions. ' . 
i r Common r e s o u r c e s (k = 1 , . . . 1 1 ) 
1 2 3 4 
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0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 
•18 . 5 1 9 1 7 5 . 9 
. 0 0 2 . . 0 
0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 
4 . 6 2 3 6 9 1 . 3 
0 . 0 0 0 . 0 
0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 
• 1 9 . 6 2 3 5 8 . 6 
0 . 0 0 0 . 1 
0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 
4 . 6 2 3 7 5 0 . 0 
0 , 0 0 0 . 0 
0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 
1 9 . 6 2 3 0 . 0 
. 5 3 5 0 . 0 
0 . 0 0 0 , 0 . 0 
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3. The centre may introducé another type of subdivision, namely a 
department taking care of a certain objective (a so-called facet 
policy). As a result, the centre negotiates simultaneously with 
two types of subdivisions (regions and departments).. 
7. Conclusion 
The combination of multiobjective and multilevel planning methods 
yields interesting weights for both parts. 
For multiobjective methods the gain is that a framework has been 
found for the analysis of conflicts bêtween subdivisions, coordinated 
by a central planning unit. 
For multilevel planning methods the gain is the idea of the costs 
of decentralization. A central planning unit may try to reduce these 
costs by specifying additional constraints on the subdivisions. 
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Appendix. A Concise Survey of Multilevel Planning Methods 
The following table contains a brief description of several important charac- •< 
teristics of 8 multilevel planning methods selected from the relevant literature. 
Methods 1-5 are direct, methods 6-8 are indirect. This table provides useful 
information for ah evaluation of,the methods. The following criteria are inter 
alia relevant for such an evaluatioh: . • " 
1. the amount of prior information necessary for the centre and the subdivisxons 
to be able to.start the procedure. 
2. the complexity'of the activities of' the centre and the subdivisions to be, 
performed in each step. . 
3. the size of the information streams per iteration. 
4-. the number of iterations. • 
5. the possibility.to exclude misleading answers of the subdivisions. 
6. the possibility to generalize the methods for multiobjective problems. 
ad 1.•The methods 5, 7 and 8 are less favourable than the. other methqds. 
ad 2. Method. 3 is less complex for the centre than the other methods.. 
ad 3. Indirect, methods give rise to smaller amounts of information to be exchangec 
per iteration than direct methods. 
ad.4. Methods 2, 5 and 8 converge faster than the other methods. 
ad 5.'In methods 4- and 6 it appears to be unfavourable for the subdivisions to 
provide false information. The reason is that^ in these methods the distri-
^ bution of resources is assumed to be given. For all other methods, the 
centre faces the problem that the subdivisions may, try to obtain an extra . 
large .part of the common resources by giving misleading iifformation. 
ad 6. Direct methods are more suitable to deal with multiobjective problems.than 
indirect methods. 
Obviously, there is no method which dominates all other methods according to 
all criteria. In the set of direct methods, methods 2 and 3 seem to be more 
attractive than 1, I-and 5. In the set of indirect methods, method 8 seems to be" 
more appropriate than the methods 6 and 7. 
Method 
nature of indices 
generated by centre 
1. Kornai, 1965 
2. ten Kate, 1972.. 
3. Schleicher, 1971 
4. Malinvaud, 1972 
(sectipn 8.4) 
5. Weitzman, 1970 
6. Malinvaud, 1972 
(section 8.3) 
7. Malinvaud, 1972 
(section 8.5). 
8. Dantzig & Wolfe, 
1960. 
quantities of resources 
and outputs.. 
ii 
ii 
ii 
unfeasible targets 
(outputs) and quota 
(resources) 
prices of outputs and 
resources 
ii 
' ii 
nature of indices 
generated by subdivision 
relation 
function 
function 
shadow prices of central 
constraints 
shadow prices of central 
constraints: n 
shadow prices of central 
constraints 
marginal rates öf 
substitution 
an arbitrary feasiblè ef-
ficiënt combination of 
output and resources as 
well as the corresponding 
prices 
quantities demanded and 
supplied 
optimal technical coef-
ficients, given the prices 
quantities demanded and 
supplied 
ü) (x., ,, 
c —1' 
no objec 
the meth 
equilibr 
is assum 
no const 
objectiv 
see Mali 
see Weit 
ü) (X- . . 
c —1, 
way of producing ., 
information by centre 
way of producing 
information by subdivision 
1) solution of problems anal-
ogous to (4.5), foliowed by 
"averaging" procedure 
2) solution of dual of Dantzig-
-Wolfe problem (4.6) 
3) direct redistribution 
of a, on the basis of TT, k kr 
4) 
5) solution of problem sim-
ilar'to (4.6); the informa-
tion contained in the ma-
trices B can be approxi-
mated in an increasingly. 
accurate way by means.of 
the subdivision's responses 
6) responses of the direct 
adjustment of prices, 
given revealed excess 
demand or supply . 
7) solution of the dual of 
a problem similar to (4.3); 
the information contained 
in-the matrices B can be 
r . 
approximated ïtv an increas-
ingly accurate way by means 
of the subdivisionfs re-
sponses 
8) solution of (4.3) 
solution of the dual' of 
(3.4) , foliowed by an 
"averaging" procedure 
solution of the dual of 
(3.4) 
solution of (3.5) 
solution of (3.5) 
'" 
information, necessary for the 
centre to be able to start the 
interaction 
starting values of a,....a ; a 
ii 
ii 
ii 
• (over-optimistic) approxiraa-
ted values of B ; A ; starting 
• r r 
values of a (r=l,....R) 
—r. 
a ; starting values of tlie prices 
'tf' ' . 
• a_ ; a combination of technical 
coefficients 
a ; some starting values x 
(r-=l,....R); c A ; (r = 1 v) 
29 
Notes 
1) In this study the subdivisions are conceived of as regions. The concepts 
of multilevel planning can also be applied to other types of subdivisions 
. such as sectors, faculties of a university, or the department of an orga-
nization or of-a government. 
2) For the ease of presentation ?i will, for each of the types, be called the 
vector with common resources. 
3) Some methods to generate feasible provisional solutions have been developed, 
but these will not be discussed in this context. ¥e also will not deal with v 
the problems arising when S is uhbounded. For these technical aspects we 
refer to Dantzig [1963]. 
4) Formula (4.4) may cause some minor problems, In particular when a, = 0. In 
K 
that case an appropriate positive number shouïd be substituted for [ a. | in 
K 
(4.4). If side-conditions have been formulated for the a. (for example 
kr r 
av t 0), (4.4) can be adapted in a straightforward way. See Johansen 
[1978, p.156]. * 
5) This identxty of (4.5) and (4.7) for i=l implies that in the beginning of the 
iterative process the Ten Kate method may have the same anomalies as Kornai's 
method, viz. rather extreme outcomes may be generated. Ten Kate shows that this 
can be remedied by the introduction of upper or lower bounds into (4.7). After 
* 
a finite number of steps these bounds will become inactive constraints. 
6) A problem arising in all multilevel planning methods is that the division 
proposed by the centre may appear infeasible for one or more subdivisions. In 
Ten Kate's approach this problem has been tackled as follows. 
If a_ yields an unfeasible solution, then a new proposal can be calculated 
as q a* +(l-q) a_ for q < 1. Reduce q stepwise until all divisional problems 
are feasible. .  _. 
7) The reason of this exceptional result can be found in equation (6.3) of the 
model. When the centre proposes during the interaction certain quota of 
pollutants to be emitted by each subdivision, it implicitly determines the 
value of the environmental objective - co. in each subdivision, which 
2r 
means that the remaining subdivisional decision problem is essentially 
single-objective. 
- 3 0 -
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